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Chapter1
INTRODUCTION
For many years a system of leading, coincident, and lagging eco-
nomic indicators, first developed in the 1930s by the National Bu-
reau of Economic Research (NBER), has been widely used in the
United States to appraise the state of the business cycle. Since 196].
the current monthly figures for these indicators have been published
by the U.S. Department of Commerce in Business Conditions Digest.
Similar systems have been developed by government or private agen-
cies in Canada, Japan, the United Kingdom, and more recently in
many other countries. A few years ago the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) set up a working party
to develop this type of analysis and most of the member countries
participated. The Center for International Business Cycle Research
(CIBCR) has given guidance in this field to some fifteen countries
in recent years in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and South
America.
Our purpose in this chapter is to explain briefly the theory and
rationale underlying this approach to economic forecasting. We will
also provide a brief summary of our study, detailing how the indica-
tors have performed in practice, in the United States and nine other
countries. The book will conclude with some suggestions for future
research and development, including the application of the approach
to the analysis of inflation.
3r-1




Wesley Clair Mitchell's first major work on business cycles was pub-
lished in 1913.1 Many of his contemporaries thought business cycles
were essentially short-run, self-correcting phenomena scarcely m e
need of special policy, let alone study. From the very beginning
Mitchell seems to have understood the necessity of acquiring factual
information about economic instability before attempting to develop
theoretical explanations for the phenomena so many others of that p
time chose to ignore. As long ago as 1927, for example, Mitchell d
wrote: "For theoretical uses, there is needed a systematic record of
cyclical alternations of prosperity and depression, covering all coun-
C
tries in which the phenomena have appeared, and designed to make
clear the recurrent features of the alternations."2 Thus, the approach
to the analysis of instability was international virtually from the out-
set. What Mitchell proposed to do was to examine the "cycles of
reality" in a fairly large numbr of countries by amassing as many of
the statistical records of these fluctuations as could be found. This
was one of the reasons why in 1920 he launched the National Bu-
reau of Economic Research. It is critical to bear in mind that this
statistical collection and analysis was but a part of his overall plan
C
thatwas basically directed toward explaining these cycles of reality. r
We should, therefore, underscore that in the 1927 comment quoted
above it was for theoretical uses that the systematic statistical record
was needed. The methodology to be summarized in Chapter 2 was
many years in the making, and involved a lengthy process of collec-
tion and detailed analysis of many time series that together were and
continue to be reflections of the fluctuations market-oriented econo-
mies have experienced at least since the Industrial Revolution.
This methodology was essentially completed in the late 1930s and
was presented in a 1946 volume by Arthur F. Burns and W.C. Mitch-
ell entitled Measuring Business Cycles.3 When Burns and Mitchell
published this pioneering work, it represented the culmination of a
quarter century's thought about the nature of cyclical disturbances
in industrialized market-oriented economies and how such distur-
bances might be studied. The book set off arguments about whether
or not one could productively measure anything without a "proper"
theory or hypothesis, and there were arguments at a more technical
level surrounding the methodology itself. Thus, debate in the 1940s ti
frequently revolved around the relationship of the National Bureau
methodology to earlier theories of business fluctuations, as well as to1
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therelationships between the Mitchellian approach to cyclical analy-
sis, the Keynesian policies of the day, and the emergent econometric
revolution.
b Today instability manifests itself primarily by widespread and
1 more or less unremitting difficulties in controlling inflation and un-
c es employment in most of the industrialized market-oriented econo-
in mies of the developed world. Economists of whatever methodologi-
ing cal persuasion, and of whatever policy school, are increasingly being
asked to account for the continued presence of phenomena that have
OP proved remarkably resistant to both understanding and control. Why
do we continue to experience business cycles? Is another recession ef as severe as 1973—75, let alone 1929-32, likely to occur? How do
0 cycles spread from one country to another? How can they best be
Un- ameliorated? These are among the most pressing economic questions
a of our time. Mitchell's methodology and the business cycle indicators





his It is widely held that Bums and Mitchell's Measuring Business Cy-
cles was nontheoretical, if not antitheoretical. They considered the
relation of their work to extant theories of business fluctuations and
stated their view of the relationship of what they were doing to that
body of theory in the following way:
Our aim is to determine as thoroughly as we can what business cycles are.
cc- ... Thisobjective is always before us in later monographs, where we pre-
nd pare materials as well as we can in advance for a systematic attack in a
1O- theoretical volume. But we believe that an intelligible notion of what busi-
ness cycles are can best be reached from available statistical records by a
nd process of successive approximation. The primary objective of our mono-
graph on cyclical behavior is to describe in a preliminary way the typical
ell features of business cycles.4
a Mitchell died before the theoretical volume could be written, but
as this and many other passages make clear, he regarded his work as a
necessary stage in the development of a viable and reasonably realis-
tic theory of business fluctuations.
The approach Burns and Mitchell took largely eschewed many pre-
vious theoretical explanations, and we shall return to those explana-
Os tions and their relationship to the Bureau's methodology. Here we
note only that Burns and Mitchell both regarded the methodology
and their book detailing that methodology as contributing to a theo-6 International Economic Indicators
reticalunderstanding of cyclical instability. Having developed the
methodology, for example, and having developed ultimately a set of
indicators that typically lead or lag behind business cycle turning an
points emerging from the application of that methodology, Mitchell "1
commented, "No attempt is made there] to explain why the series tr4
behave as they do, but anyone who goes over the entries thought-
fully will find his mind seething with rationalizations, and with er
conjectures regarding the effects produced by the recorded move- ha
ments."5 That this was Bums's view as well is clear from many of
hisstatements. In his introduction to What Happens During Business ti(
Cycles, for example, Burns no doubt expressed his own as well as cr1
Mitchell's wish when he noted,
The wish to contribute to economic policy was strong in Mitchell. Stronger ca
still was his conviction that intelligent control of business cycles depends in
upon sound theoretical understanding, which requires tojerably full and ki
accurate knowledge of what the business cycles of experience have been
like.6
It is true that Measuring Business Cycles made more references to
statisticians and others concerned with measuring cycles than to the
multitude of economists who have tried to develop theories of the th
cycles. There are references to Jevons, Juglar, Keynes, Schumpeter, ac
and the like. But there are more references to Leonard Ayres, Roger M
Babson, Frederick Macaulay, Geoffrey Moore, Frederick Mifis, War-
ren Persons, Willard Thorp, and others whose work is even now
rarelyconnected with any particular theory of instability. There are th
also references to investigators like Abramowitz who defy such neat ri(
categorization. cc
Economic theory in general has scarcely been immune to the
charge of oversimplification. In this regard it is worth recalling that
at the end of his 'summary of extant business cycle theories, RA.
Gordon felt compelled to comment, "None of these models should
betaken too seriously as an explanation of what happens during the
cycles of reality. They are too simple."7 Whatever else one says of
the methodology developed at the National Bureau, it did not regard
the cycle as a simple phenomenon.
Rejecting the simplistic, therefore, Mitchell and his co-workers at
the National Bureau determined to begin with a review of the statisti-
cal record. Burns and Mitchell wrote, "The way we have chosen is to
observe the business cycles of history as closely and systematically as
we can before making a fresh attempt to explain them."8 The mate- I'
rial set out in Measuring Business Cycles, initially criticized as "mea- to surement without theory,"9 has long since been accepted and forms U the basis of much current cyclical analysis in the United States.Introduction 7
the TheRole of Reference Dates
Oneof the crucial steps in the Burns-Mitchell approach to the
jng analysis of cyclical disturbances lies in the choice of reference dates.
"Reference dates" is the National Bureau's term for the peaks and
ries troughs, selected after study of many time series and chosen to rep-
resent the turning points in a country's business cycles. The consid-
erations that enter into their selection, originally quite judgmental,
ye- have now been codified to be programmed for the computer.'° Corn-
puter-selected turning points are still corroborated by visual inspec-
tion, however, because of known inadequacies in the programmed
criteria.
Reference dates are important because they ultimately form the
basis for subsequent analysis of all time series, including the classifi-
r cation into leading, roughly coincident, or lagging indicators. These
indicators, discussed in the next section of this chapter, represent
d kinds of economic activity, culled from long years of experimenta-
tion with literally hundreds of series, which, in the experience of
National Bureau analysis, have historically been most reliable in fore-
to casting, recording, and confirming U.S. business cycles. It is impor-
the tant, therefore, that reference dates reflect as accurately as possible
the the shift from expansion to contraction in "the aggregate economic
ter, activity" of the business enterprise economies to which Burns and
ger Mitchell applied their technique.
The choice of reference dates begins with the selection of appro-
priate turning points in a number of individual time series, primarily
are those series that in themselves constitute measures of aggregate eco-
eat nomic activity—that is, income, output, employment, and trade. The
considerations involved in such selections are, of course, akin to
those used for choosing turning points in any time series. The conver-
kat sion of such information into reference dates involves judicious de-
:.A. termination of what constitutes the "preponderence" of evidence
with respect to cyclical fluctuations in aggregate economic activity.
Ultimately, one can judge the appropriateness of the reference dates
by the behavior of a variety of measures of economic activity around
these points of reference. Thus, while the reference dates are required
to differentiate leading, roughly coincident, and lagging indicators,
at the appropriateness of the dates can also be judged, when there is a
considerable historical record on which to base timing classifications,
by the consistency with which leaders lead, coinciders coincide, and
laggers lag. In a sense, the analysis of timing becomes an interactive
process.
ea- Since the original formulation by Burns and Mitchell, such a his-
torical record has, of course, been built up, most particularly for the
United States. But Measuring Business Cycles, despite its understand-8 International Economic Indicators
ableemphasis on the United States, included an effort to develop
reference cycle chronologies for other countries as well.
THEINDICATOR SYSTEM
Theleading, coincident, and lagging indicators cover a wide variety
of economic processes that have been found to be important in busi-
ness cycles. The leading indicators are, for the most part, measures
of anticipations or new commitments. They have a "look-ahead"
quality and are highly sensitive to changes in the economic climate as
perceived in the marketplace. The coincident indicators are compre-
hensive measures of economic performance, pertaining to output,
employment, income, and trade. They are the measures to which
everyone looks to determine whether a nation is prosperous or de-
pressed. The lagging indicators are more sluggish in their reactions to
the economic climate, but they serve two useful functions. First,
since lagging indicators are usually very smooth, they help to confirm
changes in trend that are initially reflected in the more erratic lead-
ing and coincident indicators. Second, their very sluggishness can be
an asset in cyclical analysis, because when they do begin to move, or
when they move more rapidly, they may show that excesses or im-
balances in the economy are developing or subsiding. Hence, the lag-
ging indicators frequently provide the earliest warnings of all, as
when rapid increases in costs of production outstrip price increases
and threaten profit margins, thus inhibiting new commitments to
invest, which are among the leading indicators.
The list of the "most reliable indicators" has been revised a num-
ber of times (1938 was the first such publication, and subsequent
revisions were made in 1950, 1960, 1966, and 1975). Our study of
international economic indicators is based heavily on the 1966 U.S.
list.1' This list was the current one at the time the international work
was begun. As we shall illustrate below, however, many of these indi-
cators have survived one of the longest continuous testing programs
of empirical findings against subsequent data in the field of econom-
ics—from 1938 to 1976. These indicators are at the heart of the
international analysis presented here.
The procedure in selecting and classifying indicators is one in
which economic theory and empirical observation closely interact.
The indicator that has a near-perfect record of performance during
a business cycle, but whose behavior cannot be explained, will not
command or warrant much attention, since faith depends on under-
standing. On the other hand, the indicator that is suggested by theo-
retical considerations but has not been tested or does not performIntroduction 9
op as theory predicts will not command much attention either, since
faith depends on performance. With these precepts in mind let us
look at the classification of U.S. indicators that we have been using
in developing an international system of business cycle indicators
(Table 1—1).
ty The first column on the left lists six broad types of economic pro-
cess that figure in most theories of the business cycle. Most of the
es variables .that are today employed in econometric models can be
1" found under one or another of these categories. There are, however,
some important exceptions. Foreign trade is not shown explicitly,
e- although it is implicit in the second group (production, income, con-
t sumption, and trade). Taxes and government expenditures do not
appear explicitly either, although they are conspicuous in most mod-
e- els. Here the reason is not that government has no impact on the
to business cycle, but rather that most measures of its activity have not
performed very consistently as indicators. The same comment could
be made about agricultural production.
d- The indicators in the body of the table were selected from the six
types of economic process, again with a view both to their contribu-
tion to theory and empirical performance. Performance has been
judged primarily with respect to the consistency with which the mea-
sure has conformed to business cycles and led, coincided, or lagged
behind the cycles' turning points. An indicator can have too many
cycles or too few; one-to-one correspondence is preferable. An mdi-
cator can lead on some occasions and lag at other times; uniformity
in timing is preferable. Other criteria play a role too. Comprehensive
coverage of the economy is preferable to narrow coverage. Prompt
availability of current figures is important, and, coupled with that,
monthly figures are preferred to quarterly.
Within each of the economic process groups, reading across the
I table,are indicators that lead as well as those that coincide or lag.
This is one reason for thinking of them as processes. The activities
represented normally follow a sequence. The average workweek, for
example, is one of the first variables pertaining to employment that
manufacturing enterprises change, either by increasing or reducing
the amount of overtime work or by changing the number of persons
1 workingshort hours or fewer days per week. Changes in the number
of persons employed usually occur a few months later, because such
changes are less easily reversed and are more expensive to accomplish.
Every entry in Table 1-i. has been supported by detailed studies
- showingthat the indicators not only behave in the manner specified
•
- bythe classification but also that there are cogent economic reasons































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































412 International Economic Indicators
thesequences across columns but also the more or less simultaneous
relationships among the indicators within each column: how stock
prices are related to profits, materials prices to inventory investment,
production to employment, sales to income, and so on. Finally, these
studies have developed the reasons for and evidence underlying a
relationship not explicitly shown in the table—a relationship that
helps to explain why one business cycle tends to generate the next
one.
This relationship has to do with the influence of the lagging inch-
cators upon the subsequent movements of the leading indicators. An
increase in the level of inventories, especially in relation to sales, if it
proceeds far enough, is likely to cause buyers to cut back their orders.
Here a lagging indicator, inventories, has an inverse effect upon a
leading indicator, new orders. Similarly, a rapid increase in expendi-
tures for new plant and equipment may, as output and capital utili-
zation rates build up, result in a cutback in contracts for new plant
construction. Likewise, an increase in interest rates on business loans
may at some stage trigger decisions to reduce orders for machinery
and equipment and to reduce the rate at which inventories of mate-
rials are accumulated. In short, there are feedback relationships run-
fling from the lagging indicators to the subsequent, opposite turns
in the leading indicators. These relationships, too, have been docu-
mented empirically, as we shall see.
The hardest test for a theory or system of indicators to meet, as
with any other economic theory or system, is one that requires it to
perform on data that were not available when it was formulated. The
U.S. indicators have experienced many such tests. One, covering
twenty-five. years and based on data not available when, in 1950, a
set of indicators was selected and classified, is contained in Table Cl
1—2. q
The empirical evidence used to select and classify indicators in the U
1950 study covered periods of varying length but ended in 1938. U
Twenty-one indicators were selected as the end-product of a study it
covering some 800 series. Eight of the twenty-one were classified as
leading, eight coincident, and five lagging. Fifteen of the twenty-one B
are still shown currently in Business Conditions Digest, and close S(
equivalents of the other six are also in that publication. From these
twenty-one series in BCD we have constructed composite indexes,
using a method developed in the late 1950s, and covering the period U
1948 to 1975. The indexes have been adjusted for long-run trend, Si
usinga method developed in the 1970s. The turning points in the
trend-adjusted series are compared in Table 1-2 with the peaks andIntroduction13
troughsin a chronology of growth cycles, a concept of the business
cycle that has come into use in many countries only in recent years,
which we shall discuss more fully below.
The test in Table 1—2, therefore, not only confronts the twenty-
one indicators with data not available when they were chosen, but
also with methods of analysis unavailable then. The results, recorded
in the left-hand section of the table, show that the expected sequence
among the three groups of indicators occurred at almost every turn
throughout the period. The lagging indicators not only lag the
growth cycle as expected but also lead the opposite turns in the lead-
it ers, which is also as expected and as demonstrated in 1950.
Even though the indicators selected in 1950 turned in a good rec-
a ord during the next twenty-five years, research on indicators and
business cycles did not stand still. (Chapter 2 will discuss some of
these changes in methodology.) In addition, the indicators them-
t selves have improved. More of them are available in deflated form,
more are published in seasonally adjusted form, some are available
more promptly, there is better coverage of inventories and of price!
cost relationships, and so on. In 1975 the Department of Commerce
established a new list of indicators, arid its record during the preced-
ing twenty-five years is shown on the right-hand side of Table 1-2.
The results are similar, on the whole, to those achieved by the 1950
list, partly because the content overlaps to a considerable extent. The
L userof indicators would, however, not hesitate a moment in opting
for the 1975 list in view of its improved coverage of significant
variables.
From this brief review of U.S. experience we contend that the
a conceptual framework underlying the indicator approach to business
cycle forecasting has stood up well under repeated tests on subse-
quent data. Much room for error and uncertainty remains, as witness
the uncertainty in 1982 over the prospects for recovery from the
then current U.S. recession. But we know much more about the mer-
its and limitations of the system than we did thirty years ago.
is The study of foreign countries constitutes a further test of the
Burns—Mitchell approach. If the results of our study reveal that the
series that prove reliable both as leading and confirming indicators
in the United States exhibit similar behavior in relation to cyclical
• turning points in other countries, this would confirm a fundamental
• theorem of Burns and Mitchell: namely, that their method of analy-
sis is applicable to cycles in countries that organize their work mainly







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Itis clearly a coincidence that the Great Depression occurred just
before Measuring Business Cycles was completed (its publication was
delayed by World War II) and that there has not been a depression of
such severity since. While most postwar cycles have been milder and
of a somewhat different character than the prewar cycles, even rela-
tively severe ones have not disappeared. If the long expansion of the
1960s in the United States and favorable experience abroad led some
to declare that the business cycle was obsolete, this was a euphoric
view that was far from universally held, and it was all too soon re-
futed by the widespread contraction of 1973-
Whilesuch contractions may be rare in the future, we now realize
that to the NBER's previous emphasis on expansion and contraction
in the absolute level of economic activity must be added efforts to
account for changes in the rate of growth. Concern about growth
rates has increased as our willingness to tolerate either high inflation
or high unemployment has declined. Fortunately, growth cycles, as
we shall see, give considerable evidence of being simply a variant
within the same species of business fluctuations.
use Mintz noted the significance of growth cycles in her study of
postwar cycles in Germany.'3 She also focused attention at the Na-
tional Bureau on applying the basic methodology for cyclical analysis
to countries outside the United States. Her study therefore repre-
sented a major effort to date turning points in business cycles when
the latter were defined and measured as upswings and downswings in
the rate of growth ("growth cycles") rather than as expansions and
contractions in levels of aggregate activity ("classical cycles"), the
type of turning point typically found in the pre-Worid War II period.
This distinction has come to the fore especially since World War II.
Prior to that time there were, of course, many cyclical episodes in
the United States, some severe, and some not so severe. But, in gen-
eral, cyclical episodes were of sufficient severity that viewing a busi-
ness cycle as a period of absolute expansion and absolute contraction
in the level of aggregate economic activity made sense. Such a view
of business cycles concentrates on what we now refer to as "classical
cycles." For many years after World War II real growth tended to be
fairly rapid in the United States, and even more rapid in many other
industrialized market-oriented economies. More recently, the upsurge
in inflation has produced even more spectacular growth rates in
aggregate economic activity expressed in current prices.'4r
Introduction17
Theresult was that for long periods, by historical standards, there
were no classical cycles. The decade of the 1960s was such a period
in the United States, and the postwar period (through 1965) was
such a period in West Germany. But Mintz found that if cycles were
s viewed not as periods of absolute expansion and decline in the level
of activity, but rather as cyclical changes in the rate of growth, one
d could discern a good many more cycles, and they could be found
during long periods characterized by the absence of classical cycles.
These "growth cycles" are represented by deviations from a long.
run trend that generally depicts long-term growth. Growth cycle
turning points are related to, but are not the same as, turning points
in classical cycles. One can, therefore, produce two business cycle
chronologies for a given country, one depicting classical cycles and
the other growth cycles. Classical cycles will generally show up in a
fl growth cycle chronology, but all growth cycles will not appear in
0 classical cycle chronologies.
h The historical experience with dating business fluctuations at
the National Bureau has been confined largely to classical cycles, al-
though Burns and Mitchell's Measuring Business Cycles contained a
chapter devoted to the effect of trend adjustment upon cyclical mea-
sures, thus anticipating the distinction between growth and classical
cycles. The Mintz study of West German fluctuations in the postwar
period and her subsequent study developing a growth cycle chronol-
IS ogy for the United States represent significant efforts to apply the
techniques developed previously for dating classical cycles to the
kind of growth cycles typical of enterprise-oriented economies since
World War II. In the next chapter we shall describe the technique as
we have applied it to growth cycle analysis.
e By concentrating on the dating of these "growth cycles," rather
I. than on what we now call "classical cycles," the emphasis in this
1. book is, therefore, placed on the kind of instability most typical of
the market-oriented economies of the contemporary world. In this
approach classical recessions (periods of negative growth) are re-
t- gardedas part of the low-growth phases. While there are good rea-
Sons for concentrating here on growth cycles, the worldwide reces-
V sions in 1973—75 and 1979—81 showed clearly that classical cycles
are by no means a thing of the past, regardless of whether or not
growth cycles are the wave of the future.
r.
P
-18 international Economic Indicators
PREVIOUS WORK ON INTERNATIONAL thE
INDICATORS Bu
str
Twenty years ago Julius Shiskin, writing on the possible uses of to
monthly reporting on the status of the indicators (an idea that came
to fruition in the United States with the publication, beginning in ma
1961, of Business Conditions Digest), concluded: CY(
The indicator series and summary measures provide a sensitive and reveal- ma
ing picture of the ebb and flow of economic tides, which a skillful analyst
of the economic, political, and international scene can use to improve his
chances of making a good forecast of short-run economic trends. In sum-
mary, if one is aware of their limitations and alert to events in the world
around him, the indicators do provide useful guideposts for taking stock
of the economy and its needs.'5 CYE
Indicators had always been viewed merely as one useful addition to mc
the forecasting and diagnostic tools of business cycle specialists. To-
day the U.S. indicators are widely watched and followed, but we
would still claim no more for them than Shiskin did. The possibility Co
of developing them for a number of industrialized market-oriented Ec
economies, and reporting their status monthly, however, opens many at
new and potentially valuable avenues for further research and pro- in
gress toward prompt diagnosis of international economic instability bei
and inflationary pressures. ish
Before turning to an analysis of the indicator data provided by our
work on the International Economic Indicator project, let us summa-
rize what has been done in the years since Shiskin 's judicious assess- Ca1
ment of the prospect of improving our understanding of cyclical
developments and forecasting ability by use of indicators (see Bibli- pri
ography). We shall focus on work done for countries other than the col
United States, cat
One of the difficulties arising from such a review is the ambiguous shi
nature of the term "indicator." Most countries now produce some of
publication concerning recent developments with regard to indica-
tors. Almost invariably, however, the word simply refers to measures reg
of aggregate economic activity or related economic data, which the
publication reports on a current basis. This usage, of course, follows of
the long-standing practice of agencies such as the OECD, which for pr
many years has published the principal series from the national ac- all
counts of member countries along with a group of other important th
time series (balance of payments, interest rates, exchange rates, price thE
indexes, under the title Main Economic Indicators. Even where ingIntroduction19
theword "indicator" is not used, as in the United Nations' Monthly
Bulletin of Statistics, the meaning is similar. Our usage is more re-
stricted and refers to economic variables that are classified according
of to their cyclical behavior.
We have already noted Mintz's pioneering study of postwar Ger-
man cycles.'6 This study was not only the first to focus on growth
cycles rather than classical cycles, but was devoted particularly to
developing roughly coincident indicators from which postwar Ger-
many's growth cycle turning points could be selected. Mintz, how-
ever, did not deal with leading or lagging indicators. This gap is flow
being filled by the work reported here and by that of the IFO-Instj.
tute in Munich.'7
Another early effort to compare internationally the behavior of
cyclical indicators was Kathleen H. Moore's study of indicators in
the United States, Canada, and Japan.'8 This work was aided enor-
•to mously by the publication in the early 1970s (through the Japanese
Economic Planning Agency) of a bi-monthly report called Japanese
Economic Indicators. Also, the Canadian Department of Trade and
ty Commerce has issued a similar monthly publication entitled Current
Economic Indicators. These two reports were the only official ones
at all comparable to the work with NBER-type indicators developed
in the United States, until the Central Statistical Office in London
ty began in 1975 to devote a section of their Economic Trends to Brit-
ish indicators of growth cycles.
ur Working with twenty-four U.S. leading, roughly coincident, and
lagging indicators, and with twenty-eight Japanese and twenty-two
Canadian equivalents to the U.S. list, Moore examined the timing
cal relationships to discover whether the classifications found appro-
priate in the United States were also appropriate in the two foreign
he countries. This analysis enabled her to conclude, with some qualifi-
cations, that "...comparable series exhibit similar timing relation-
lus ships in all three countries."Utilizing summary indexes for each
of the three groups of indicators in each country, she considered how
regularly the leaders led the roughly coincident indicators, and how
.çes regularly the latter led the lagging indicators. Moreover, she consid-
he ered whether the lagging index in each country was a reliable leader
Ivs of the opposite turn in the leading index, a particularly valuable
property associated with lagging indicators in the United States. For
Ic- all three countries and considering the reference dates available at
it that time (roughly during the period 1948-61), she discovered that
the expected sequences prevailed at fifty-eight out of sixty-five turn-
re ing points (or close to 90% of the time). She found a perfect record20 International Economic Indicators
forthe United States, four exceptions out of twenty-three for Japan, lea
and three out of nineteen for Canada.2° gr(
In the early 1970s Desmond J. O'Dea concerned himself with the res
application of the indicator technique to the United Kingdom. Work- i rei
ing at the National Institute of Economic and Social Research in
London, O'Dea discussed with the authors the NBER approach to to the study of indicators. (London was the base from which the essen-
tial underlying historical data for the international economic indica- "d
tors project was collected during the year 1973-74.) While O'Dea
was, therefore, aware of our basic approach, he chose to apply it to
the recent U.K. experience only in a somewhat amended form. His th
first study was restricted to labor market indicators and compared
their cyclical behavior in the United States and in Great Britain.2'
This study reflected his decision to view indicators more narrowly by
examining specific kinds of series that might be expected to be reli- ca
able indicators for what he called target variables, in this instance in
unemployment. Thus, he used each target variable to provide a dif-
ferent set of reference dates, rather than develop a generalized set of us4
reference dates as the NBER has customarily employed. O'Dea went in4
on to expand his labor market indicators approach in this direction, bc4
and presented indicators of investment and production as well.22
0' Dea noted in the introduction to this work the extensive dis-
cussions he had had with the authors and with officials of the Central ef
Statistical Office in London with a view to selecting a generalized ref-
erence chronology for the United Kingdom, but decided that the B
quest was futile. Recognizing the utility of a general reference chro- ly
nology, he was nonetheless forced to conclude that ".. .itis not oi
possible to construct a general cycle by detailed consideration of a re
selection of major economic variables, as in the National Bureau's
approach. O'Dea argued, as indeed have others, that there si
were too many irregularities and special circumstances pertinent to di
the British experience since World War II to make a general method T
like that of the NBER feasible. The other participants in these dis- gi
cussions, nevertheless, have now produced growth cycle chronologies w
for postwar Britain. O'Dea indeed produced one in his 1975 book, w
only to reject it. Thus, instead of no chronologies for the United 'A
Kingdom, we now have several (see Chapter 2, especially Table 2—3).
Mention should also be made of the earliest experiments con- P
ducted by OECD with NBER-type indicators. Randolf Granzer's S(
article, "Cyclical Indicators for Manufacturing Industries," utilized
trend deviations for the Index of Industrial Production as the "refer- le
ence cycle" in each country.24 He then compared a small group of I)rT
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leadingindicators and a small group of lagging indicators to this
growth cycle referrent. In general, his leading indicators, including
results of surveys concerning orders or the ratio of orders to stocks,
reflect the European emphasis since the 1950s on "qualitative mdi-
cators"—that is, on surveys of entrepreneurial judgment with respect
to present and future conditions. (Our own work in this area is the
subject of Chapter 5.) Granzer regarded his leaders as primarily
"demand-oriented," while his lagging indicators were, in his view,
"supply-oriented" (primarily investment and employment). The
countries examined, for the decade 1963-1973, included Canada,
the United States, Japan, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany,
Italy, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. The article reflected
growing awareness in the OECD that leading, coincident, and lagging
indicators can play a useful role both in cyclical analysis and in fore.
casting. Unfortunately, the findings were presented almost entirely
in graphic form, with no summary measures of leading and lagging
indicator behavior. Granzer's study represented, nonetheless, a highly
useful step, and provided a welcome indication of the heightened
interest in dating growth cycles and developing reliable indicators,
both leading and lagging, in countries outside the United States.
From this modest first step, interest in monitoring growth cycles
has increased greatly at the OECD. Almost from the outset of our
efforts to construct a test of the feasibility of an international mdi.
cator system we have been in contact with officials at the OECD.
Because they represent a well-established agency collecting and ana-
lyzing economic time series for many countries, they were an obvi.
ous focus of our attention. Accordingly, we initiated discussions that
resulted in a continuing collaborative effort.
In 1978 the OECD established a working party on Cyclical Analy-
sis and Leading Indicators, which held meetings at least once a year
during the period 1978-1981, in which the authors participated.
This effort resulted in the establishment of growth cycle chronolo-
gies for all of the twenty-four member countries. These chronologies
were not all established on the same basis—some were primarily the
work of national experts, others were developed by the secretariat.
We have already noted that the working party decided early on that
growth cycles should attempt to measure and track cycles in "out-
put—broadly defined." Thus, the efforts at the OECD have diverged
somewhat from those reported here. For example, they do not at-
tempt a common set of indicators for the roughly coincident, much
•4 lessfor the leaders. Lagging indicators are planned but have not yet
been developed in most cases. There is more or less common treat-
ITi
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mentof time series, as all countries have or can get access to the
basic computer programs developed at the National Bureau and uti-
lized today at the Center for International Business Cycle Research.
The OECD working party no longer meets, but the work it corn-
menced continues as part of the operation of the secretariat, which
in turn is authorized to maintain contact with national experts. A
recent report summarizes the activities of both the OECD and the
member countries in this field.25 A section in Main Economic Indi-
cators also presents preliminary work on growth cycle indicators for
member countries.
Outside the OECD interest in growth cycle indicators is increasing
as well. At the European Economic Community a decision has been
made to monitor growth cycle developments in those OECD coun-
tries that belong to the Common Market. No formal publications
have emerged from the EEC, but several papers dealing with the
analysis of growth cycles in member countries have been prepared
for use by the EEC staff, and continuing contacts with the CIBCR
are maintained as well.
PLANOF THE BOOK
Thefindings reported in this book emerged from our work on inter-
national economic indicators launched at the National Bureau in
August 1973 and continued at the Center for International Business
Cycle Research.26
The initial questions prompting the present study can be summa-
rized as follows: (1) Can business cycles be dated in other countries
by means of the technique developed at the NBER for the United
States? (2) Could the NBER approach as developed for classical cy-
cles in the United States be adapted to the measurement and fore-
casting of growth cycles both in the United States and in other coun-
tries? That is, is the notion of a growth cycle a useful approach t
the study of cyclical instability in a number of market-orienteL
economies, as Mintz's original work on postwar German cycles led
one to expect? (3) Could the system of leading, roughly coincident,
and lagging indicators developed at the NBER for classical cycles be
effectively employed in the study of growth cycles both in the U.S.
and elsewhere? These questions, in turn, lead to several related prob-
lems that must be explored. Could indicators of classical cycles be-
have with sufficient sensitivity to act as reliable indicators of growth
cycles? Could the U.S. set of indicators be replicated for other coun-
tries? If so, do these indicators (or rough equivalents thereof) exhibit
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comparabletendencies to lead or lag growth cycle turning points
abroad? Assuming that growth cycle chronologies can indeed be de-
veloped for a number of countries, do they shed light on current
problems such as: the way in which instabifity is transmitted inter-
nationally; the consilience among growth cycles in industrial econo-
mies and its relationship to the generation of inflationary booms or
e severe recessions; the comparative study of particular indicators—
such as those related to the labor market—in different countries; and
r the study of the competitiveness of a particular country vis-â-vis its
• trading partners?
The chapters that follow provide the evidence we have uncovered
in an attempt to deal with these questions. Overall, our findings sup-
port the validity of the indicator approach and encourage us to m?ve
forward in developing and improving this system both in the United
States and in other industrialized economies.
Chapter 2 summarizes the methodology underlying the selection
of growth cycle turning points and presents the growth cycle chro-
nologies we have developed for the ten countries included in this
study. These chronologies are based on substantially the same mea-
sures of economic activity for each country, covering output, em-
ployment, unemployment, real income, and real volume of trade.
The growth cycle peak and trough dates represent the consensus
among the turning points of these indicators after adjustment is
made for long-run trend.
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the indicator system for each
country by examining the summary measures of leading, roughly
coincident, and lagging indicators. We then consider the composite
indexes in each country, constructed from indicators classified
according to U.S. experience, as well as the median timing of the
groups of indicators.
The behavior of the individual indicators at growth cycle turning
points for all ten countries is analyzed in Chapter 4. The result is a
detailed test of the system, which has both scientific value and prac-
tical advantages. If individual indicators that have proved to lead or
lag consistently in U.S. experience can be shown to have similar
temporal relationships in other countries, the case for indicators—
both in theory and in application to forecasting efforts—would be
strengthened.
One possibility for improving the ability to forecast growth cycles
with leading indicators, which is explored in Chapter 5, has involved
the use of so-called qualitative indicators. Survey results dealing with
what entrepreneurs think, for example, about their sales possibilities24 International Economic Indicators
arenow regularly collected in many countries. Because of the popu-
larity of these surveys abroad, their inclusion here is of considerable
potential usefulness.
Chapter 6 considers the possibility of utilizing composite indexes
for more than one country to study fluctuations in areas of the
world such as Europe, or North America, or even the entire indus-
trialized world. We find that this approach is useful in examining the
degree to which business cycles in market-oriented economies have
exhibited consilience in the years since World War U. Examining the
evidence of a world cycle is also useful in studying the spread of gen-
eral economic instability. The multicountry composite indexes used
were constructed by weighting each country's index according to its
1970 GNP.
In Chapter 7 we consider the possibilities for forecasting trade
flows by utilizing composite leading indexes that reflect economic
conditions as they develop for any country's trading partners.
Chapter 8 examines another possible application of the indicator
systems presented in this study: forecasting inflation-rate changes for
e
market-oriented economies. The development of leading, coincident,
and lagging indicators of inflation is an open field, and we need to
sharpen our awareness of new inflationary trends, or disinflationary
trends. What are the most reliable indicators for detecting these
trends? Can available measures be improved? The preliminary results
reported here have barely scratched the surface of this area of
research.
Finally, Chapter 9 suggests some ideas for future studies that will
be needed if the monitoring of international economic indicators is
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